The South Caucasus’ Economic Promise And The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy

The 2025 National Security Strategy clearly articulates a new U.S. geostrategic paradigm centered on both “burden-sharing and burden-shifting” with allies and partners in regions whose geopolitics directly intersect with American strategic interests. The South Caucasus is distinctive in this regard, functioning as a geopolitical fulcrum at the intersection of multiple, and in some cases overlapping, global strategic theaters. Within this context, Azerbaijan has emerged as a rising middle power positioned to assume greater responsibility for security across its strategic environment, which extends in a full 360° arc. South Caucasus is also rich in strategic minerals, a priority for the Trump Administration. The White House would therefore be well advised to build upon the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), reaffirming and operationalizing the commitment it made in August.

Azerbaijan’s Minister of Energy Parviz Shahbazov visited Washington on Dec 12–13, where he met with members of the U.S. House of Representatives and representatives of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, underscoring the expanding economic and political dimensions of bilateral engagement. In parallel, U.S. Representative Anna Paulina Luna (R-FL) introduced H.R. 6534 on Dec 9, legislation to repeal Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act and remove long-standing statutory restrictions on direct U.S. government assistance to Azerbaijan. Earlier in the month, Azerbaijan’s Prosecutor General, Kamran Aliyev, led an official delegation to Washington, holding meetings with senior U.S. officials across the Justice Department, the FBI, the State Department, and the Office of the Attorney General, signaling deepening institutional dialogue beyond the defense and energy spheres. Against this backdrop, a Dec 10 Times of Israel report cited a senior Azerbaijani official cautioning that Baku has not yet decided whether to contribute troops to a Gaza International Stabilization Force, reflecting both unresolved operational uncertainties and broader strategic reservations about the mission’s scope and political implications.

After eight decades of an expansive grand strategy that positioned the United States as a net security provider nearly everywhere in the world, the 2025 National Security Strategy advances the argument that not all regions carry equal strategic weight for American interests. From this perspective, a calibrated retrenchment from the Eastern Hemisphere, Eurasia in particular, is a strategically rational adjustment rather than an abrupt disengagement. The war in Ukraine has underscored that Russia no longer poses the systemic threat once represented by the Soviet Union and that, where it does remain a challenge, Europe’s collective political, economic, and military capacity is sufficient to manage it. In this framework, the United States retains a supportive and enabling role, backing allied leadership rather than serving as the default first responder.

What this recalibration does is afford the United States the bandwidth needed to act strategically, where it can play a role that others can’t. The South Caucasus is a critical node in Eurasia that warrants greater attention from Washington. In this region, which until very recently was part of the Kremlin’s sphere of influence, Azerbaijan is a dominant player. As a transcontinental state bridging Western Asia and Eastern Europe, the country occupies a strategic position across multiple regions highlighted in the National Security Strategy released by the Trump White House on December 5. It is uniquely positioned as the only country with substantial borders with both Russia and Iran, placing it at the intersection of two of Washington’s principal geopolitical challengers.

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Our most formidable challenger, China, is in fact strategically eyeing Azerbaijan. For Beijing, Baku is central to the Belt and Road Initiative, serving as a stable trans-Caspian transit hub that links the world’s second-largest economy to Europe while reducing reliance on vulnerable maritime chokepoints. It was thus good to see the Trump Administration’s decision to advance the TRIPP framework. This move reflects an effort to leverage Azerbaijan’s geography to establish a durable U.S. strategic foothold in the Eurasian interior, a space long peripheral to American influence but increasingly contested as Beijing expands at Moscow’s expense.

Checking China in practice requires a deeper U.S. push into Central Asia, and Azerbaijan has emerged as a pivotal springboard for positioning Washington in a region that sits at the intersection of all three of America’s principal adversaries. This logic aligns squarely with the 2025 National Security Strategy’s emphasis on preventing the rise of any power capable of achieving regional or global dominance by shaping favorable balances alongside partners rather than pursuing domination outright. The significance of Azerbaijan’s role was institutionalized at the Seventh Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Heads of State in Tashkent on 16 November 2025, when leaders invited Baku to join as a full member, transforming the C5 into the C6. This move formally acknowledged the emergence of a unified trans-Caspian economic and geopolitical space — one that enhances regional connectivity and strategic optionality while providing the United States a platform to influence Eurasian balances of power at relatively low cost.

Azerbaijan serves as a key access point for the critical minerals of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Its pipelines, ports, and land corridors make it a linchpin for resilient supply chains, directly supporting the 2025 National Security Strategy’s call to “maintain secure and reliable supply chains and access to critical materials.” Closer relations with Azerbaijan can ensure uninterrupted transport of energy and minerals essential for both industry and defense. By securing these routes, Azerbaijan can anchor regional supply networks and strengthen global access to critical resources.

Linking Azerbaijan to Western markets strengthens Europe’s access to energy and critical minerals independent of Russia, directly reducing Moscow’s leverage over the continent. By enhancing transport corridors through the South Caucasus, the U.S. can diversify supply chains and mitigate the risk of disruption from Russian actions, supporting the NSS goal to “reestablish strategic stability with Russia.” Azerbaijan’s role as a transit hub for Caspian resources allows the U.S. to deepen diplomatic engagement in Eurasia while fostering regional stability. In this way, integrating Azerbaijan into Western networks advances both economic resilience and broader U.S. efforts to manage European relations with Russia and prevent conflict escalation.

Azerbaijan’s location on Iran’s northwestern flank positions it as a strategic partner for managing the challenge of a regime in transition, allowing the U.S. to “prevent an adversarial power from dominating the Middle East.” By deepening security and economic ties with Azerbaijan, the U.S. can limit Iran’s ability to project power into the South Caucasus and the broader region, while creating conditions conducive to expanding “the Abraham Accords to more nations in the region and to other countries in the Muslim world.” Azerbaijan’s alignment and stability enhance regional security, providing a corridor for influence and partnership that supports broader U.S. objectives. Leveraging its proximity and strategic position, the U.S. can both counter Tehran’s disruptive influence and foster diplomatic integration across the Middle East.

Azerbaijan is well-positioned to assume primary responsibility for security in the South Caucasus, from where it can help Washington manage key adversaries, provided the U.S empowers Baku and consolidates its nascent peace process with Armenia to enable Trans-Caspian commerce. As the 2025 NSS notes, “Continuing President Trump’s approach of asking allies to assume primary responsibility for their regions, the United States will organize a burden-sharing network, with our government as convener and supporter,” and Azerbaijan is ready to be a central actor in this framework. While the NSS correctly prioritizes the Western Hemisphere and Asia, the imperatives related to the Eurasian landmass require U.S. focus on the South Caucasus. Ensuring the repeal of the obsolete Section 907 will be a key pre-requisite for this partnership. By supporting Baku through commercial incentives, technology sharing, and defense cooperation – as the NSS states, “The United States will stand ready to help…those countries that willingly take more responsibility for security in their neighborhoods”- the U.S. can strengthen regional stability, expand economic connectivity, and mitigate potential conflict.