The Audacity of Grief

It is easy to count the dead,
harder to count the grieving. One has to estimate. Every year, almost one
percent of the American population dies. The most recent available official
count, from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Vital
Statistics System, is for the year 2017: 2,813,503 registered deaths. Looking
at the numbers for 2014, Joe Biden calculated that each of those people “left
behind at least one or two people who were deeply and profoundly wounded by the
loss; some left a dozen bereft, others a score.” These bereft are the people
who “get up every single day, put one foot in front of the other, and simply
carry on.” If Biden has a natural constituency, it is to be found in this sad
census of those who mourn. “There is an army of these soldiers,” he wrote in
2017, in his memoir of his vice presidency and of his own son’s death. “By my
estimation, at any given moment, one in ten people in our country is suffering
some serious degree of torment because of a recent loss.” The calculation
conjures a great democracy of grief:

I see
them at the rope lines at any political event I do, standing there, with
something behind their eyes that is almost pleading. Please, please, help me. … So I try to be mindful, at all times, of
what a difference a small human gesture can make to people in need. What does
it really cost to take a moment to look someone in the eye, to give him a hug,
to let her know, I get it. You’re not

It is a shifting mass, this
constituency, but all of us at some point join it.

show my cards, I wish Biden were not running for president. His re-entry into
politics makes all of us breathe stale air. The three matters most fully
exhumed in advance of his announcement in April were his old stance on racial
integration and busing in the 1970s
(he opposed busing), his Senate committee’s
vile treatment of Anita Hill during the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings
of 1991, and his role in the “tough on crime” legislation of the 1990s. Biden
evokes a past that is both close and far: far because these things were decades
ago, close because they echo painfully, as if we have suddenly returned to that
past or, worse, never left it. He will be called a “moderate Democrat,” a
“centrist,” but beneath those misleading labels are specific and bitter issues
we’ll have to parse, again, ad exhaustum.
For such exhaustion to be worth it, one would have to believe that only a Biden
presidency, above all others, would deliver us from political disaster. I am
not convinced that it would. Nor would it deliver us from environmental
, the greatest disaster of all.

“baggage”—an evocative shorthand for ideology,
like it’s a suitcase we lug from train to train—is not unique. What is
distinctive about him is not his politics but something more elusive: the
chords of grief and mourning that he plays in the culture and that the culture
hears in him. To show my cards again: Criticisms aside, I am moved by those
chords. Few are so associated in the popular political imagination with
intimate grief, and few have so fully claimed its territory. Biden’s entrance
into and exit from national politics were marked by family tragedy. He was
elected to the Senate in 1972, and a few weeks later his wife and infant
daughter were killed in a car accident. In 2015, nearing the end of his vice
presidency, one of the two sons who survived that crash, Beau, died from
cancer. Biden named grief as the reason he did not seek the presidency in 2016.
Grief and mourning shape his current campaign, too, in ways that are not easy
to grasp. I suspect Biden himself has not fully grasped this mournful
predicament. Nor has the great grieving public.

Biden, left, offers words of encouragement to his bedridden son, Beau, before being sworn in as the U.S. senator from Delaware, on January 5, 1973.Brian Horton/AP Photo

was born in hardscrabble Scranton, Pennsylvania, in 1942, to a family that
imparted folksy wisdom and a salt-of-the-earth Golden Rule. “Remember, Joey,”
he recalls his mother saying, “you’re a Biden. Nobody is better than you.
You’re not better than anybody else, but nobody is any better than you.” The
Bidens were not impoverished, but they knew failure. His father’s economic
trajectory was downward, from Boston suburbs through ventures that went bust,
including a crop-dusting business on Long Island. He still wore a suit to work
every day. Vanity was an assertion of dignity: dress for the job you should
have had, not the one you have stumbled into. An eighth-grade Biden, lowly
Catholic attending a school mixer at a Presbyterian church, had to wear one of
his father’s oversized dress shirts, the cuff-links made from nuts and bolts.

the Bidens were Truman Democrats willing to give Ike a chance, but the Biden
sensibility reached back to an earlier era, to the local machine politics and
ethnic enclaves of the early twentieth century. Their world feels drawn from the
novels of James T. Farrell, written in the 1930s and ’40s, set in the working
class urban north: rambling portraits of Lonigans, O’Neills, O’Flahertys, and
so on, good-hearted but tragic stiffs, drunks, and bigots who love their
mothers and wives, and feel guilty about them. Funerals punctuate Farrell’s
novels, too.

political consciousness was formed, he’d say, at the kitchen table of his Irish
Catholic grandfather. Biden was, and in some weird way remains, a boy eager to
be included in the conversations of older men. Grandpop would defend the local
Democratic machine against the more genteel progressive reformers, because at
least the party boss was straight with you. Beware the country club types,
grandpop said, especially the ones who “think politics is beneath them,” who
“think politics is only for the Poles and Irish and Italians and Jews.”
Thinking themselves above it, they’ll sell you out. What the country club might
see as corruption was actually the benign and even noble workings of democracy.
By that archaic code, what looks like dirt is actually virtue.

there it is not so long a leap to the politician we know. Biden was the
family’s first national politician the way families have a first child to go to
college—which for the Bidens is also Biden. He entered the arena as a poor
man’s Kennedy, handsome and toothsome. His vocabulary, even now, spans the
folksy and the hifalutin. “Malarkey” is a favorite word. There’s a lot of
“God’s honest truth” and “my word as a Biden,” alongside fancier law school
words like “subrogate.” He has been mocked
for misusing “literally,” but I don’t mind it. He uses it for emphasis; what he means is closer to literarily, as in worthy of literature. To overcome his childhood stutter,
he memorized paragraphs from Emerson’s “American Scholar” and recited them over
and over again, watching his jaw struggle in the mirror: “
Meek young men grow up in libraries. … Meek young men grow up in
.” Reciting Emerson in a mirror is Biden’s answer to Abraham
Lincoln doing math on a shovel.

1966, Biden married Neilia Hunter, a non-Catholic from the better side of the
tracks—also the Republican side. He was 29 when he was elected in 1972,
upsetting the Republican incumbent in Delaware. He turned 30 in time to meet
the Senate’s constitutional age requirement. The New York Times misspelled Neilia’s name (“Nealia”) in the small
about the accident that killed her: Her station wagon was hit by a
tractor-trailer. Their one-year-old daughter Naomi also died; sons Beau and
Hunter were severely injured but made it through. “I began to understand how
despair led people to just cash it in; how suicide wasn’t just an option but a rational option,” Biden wrote in his
first political autobiography, in 2007. “But I’d look at Beau and Hunter asleep
and wonder what new terrors their own dreams held, and wonder who would explain
to my sons my being gone, too.” His chronicle of the ordeal has a simple
eloquence: “My future was telescoped into the effort of putting one foot in front
of the other.” Biden considered resigning, but agreed to stay on for six

political personality follows from that sudden tragedy, and from the rhythms of
working through grief. Amtrak Joe first started taking the train from
Wilmington to Washington and back, every day, in order not to miss a night with
his sons. What began as a story of mourning and infrastructure would become the
main symbol of Biden’s common touch, even if he takes the Acela. Mr. Smith
commutes to Washington.

Biden has been around so long, and now seems too old for the presidency, it is
striking to recall how young a senator he was in 1973, nary a year older than
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is today. But he was not really a politician of
generational change. He was a few years older than the Baby Boomers, whose age
cohort would not reach the Senate in significant numbers for another decade. He
had married young, received a law school draft deferment, and had his first
child by 1969. He embraced the early civil rights movement but did not identify
with the New Left. “Biden resents being called the bright young liberal of the
New Left,” Kitty Kelley observed in a lively, gossipy profile of him in 1974.
He boasted liberal positions on “civil rights and civil liberties,” and on
health care, “because I believe it is a birth right of every human being—not
just some damn privilege to be meted out to a few people.” But when it came to
“abortion, amnesty, and acid,” Kelley quoted him saying, “I’m about as liberal
as your grandmother.”

shows Kelley his “favorite picture” of his late wife, in which she’s wearing a
bikini. “She had the best body of any woman I ever saw. She looks better than a
Playboy bunny, doesn’t she?” Looking back on the long hours of his Senate campaign,
Biden says sadly that he would usually get home too tired to talk. “I might
satisfy her in bed but I didn’t have much time for anything else.” A year and a
half after her death, he is dating a journalist but knows he’s “still in love
with his wife.” The hint of prurience was probably less incongruous in the 1970s
than it would be now: Biden combined an up-to-date sexual frankness with a more
archaic family-man conservatism. He was a cradle Catholic who had embraced
birth control.

1974, a little over a year into his first term, on a PBS public-debate show
about campaign finance reform, he called himself a “token young person,” “like
the token black or the token woman.” Small gasps and chuckles could be heard in
the audience when he made this comparison. But within the small world of the
Senate, at least, he was a token: The average age of the Senate was 55. (It is
62 now, alas.) A token is not part of a wave; to the contrary, Biden had to
form alliances with older senators. The only way he secured the positions that
later defined his career—leadership of the Senate Judiciary and Foreign
Relations Committees—was through strategic deference to his elders. Within the
Democratic Party, those elders included lions who had struggled to sustain
something like an American welfare state, like Hubert Humphrey, and the old
segregationists of the South, like James Eastland and John Stennis.

micro-generational experience has made Biden an interesting but also
frustrating narrator of recent American history. His eulogy for the South
Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond in 2003 is a case in point. Thurmond, the
original Dixiecrat of 1948, famous for a 24-hour filibuster against civil
rights in 1957, had defected from the Democratic Party in 1964, as Lyndon
Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act. By the time Biden showed up in the Senate,
Thurmond had hired a black staffer, ostensibly turning some kind of page on his
racist past. Thurmond and Biden formed an unlikely cross-party,
trans-generational friendship. In his eulogy, Biden emphasized that change of
heart: “I choose to believe that Strom Thurmond was doing what few do once they
pass the age of 50: He was continuing to grow, continuing to change.”

also told a story there that he’s told many times since. In 1990, he took the
office of another old segregationist, the retiring Democratic Senator John
Stennis of Mississippi. The mahogany table in that room, Stennis told him, “was
the flagship of the Confederacy from 1954 to 1968”; the Southern Manifesto had
been signed upon it, but “now it’s time,” Stennis said, “it’s time that this
table go from the possession of a man against civil rights to a man who is for
civil rights.” The story ends with Stennis’s tendentious moral awakening:

civil rights movement [Stennis said to Biden] did more to free the white man
than the black man.” And I looked at him, I didn’t know what he meant. And he
said in only John Stennis fashion, he said, “It freed my soul; it freed my

It is a great story for a
eulogy, and Biden is a fluent eulogist. In the telling, though, the civil
rights movement is reduced to an old white man’s tidy moral melodrama. Biden
arrives at the melodrama’s conclusion, as if granting absolution after a
deathbed conversion. It is not his to grant.   

“All politics is local.” It is
an oft-quoted, scolding reminder to D.C.-types that their policies will be
judged against the hard and humdrum facts of their constituents’ lives. Wise
words. Then again, the only people who ever have cause to utter this truism are
the ones whose ambitions are not at all local. The phrase is attributed to Tip
O’Neill, the former speaker of the House in the 1980s and, like every
half-remembered congressman, Biden’s old friend. Biden has claimed “to improve
on that statement”: “I believe all politics is personal, because at bottom,
politics depends on trust, and unless you can establish a personal
relationship, it’s awfully hard to build trust.” This improvement on the
“local” bromide is in fact a very different idea, and not necessarily an
improvement. It asserts not concrete interest but mere personality. (It is
also, while we’re at it, the opposite of the New Left-era feminist refrain that
“the personal is political.”)

applies the maxim, first, to the emphatically non-local arena of foreign
policy, because in foreign policy you have to negotiate with “people from
different countries” who “know little about one another, and have little shared
history and experience.” This was central to his profile in the 1980s and 1990s,
as a senator who knew world leaders by name and by handshake, and who cast
liberal internationalism as a game of mano-a-mano, eye-to-eye. This has given him
an abundance of “personal” anecdotes, like the time he was in Moscow to talk
arms control, and said to Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin, “They have an
expression where I come from: Don’t bullshit a bullshitter.” Biden’s Kremlin
has the same codes as the old Scranton political machine.

All politics is personal is the slogan
of a glad-hander, and glad-handing is what Biden does. Domestically, Biden’s
appeal smacks of locality, but it is not a rooted locality. The Bidens are
relatable because they moved for work. He hails not from Scranton or
Wilmington, but from postindustrial Everytown, USA. His spiritual home is less
a particular place than the train between places. For that matter, the Delaware
he represented in the Senate is the Delaware of banks, rootless corporations
that keep Delaware zip codes because of the state’s favorable tax laws. Biden’s
support for that “local” industry has made him, as one profile put it, “the
Senator from MBNA,” the Wilmington-based bank bought by Bank of America in

glad-handing is not without depth, though. He isn’t exactly a traveling
salesman. The glad-hander was one of the central modern personalities in David
Riesman’s midcentury portrait of American national character, The Lonely Crowd; beneath the
glad-hander’s ingratiating smile, there pulled an undertow of yearning and
anomie, symptomatic of the culture that produced him. The Bidenite glad-hander,
that is to say, offers emotional connection in a society of strangers, and
having known sorrow makes Biden the best glad-hander in the business. He is
unctuous, but his unctuousness carries some powerful residue of sacred unction.
It is somehow unsurprising to learn that Biden himself received Catholic last
rites—extreme unction—in 1988, when a brain aneurysm leaked and he was rushed
into surgery. “It surprised me,” he wrote later, “but I had no real fear of dying.”
He has had a foot on the other side. I am not saying that Biden has traded on
family tragedy; rather, he is fluent in the esoteric language of private grief,
and can detect that language’s other speakers. He joins us for a moment in our
quiet corner of loss.

I am describing is not as shallow as someone “feeling your pain,” the way Bill
Clinton felt your pain. The contrast with Clinton is instructive. The slightly
younger Clinton, a true Boomer, was another “New Democrat” associated in the
popular mind with a specific place and with white economic hardship. Clinton
was the boy from “a place called Hope,” an Arkansas Bubba, who became a
“tactile politician” in the worst sense. But Clinton projects cunning: He made
his way to Yale and Oxford, and had a prodigious memory and granular command of
policy, which fueled his tendency toward devious ideological triangulation.
Clinton’s scandal combined demonic sensuality, abuse of power, and craven
dishonesty. Of the Lewinsky affair he said, years later, “I did something for
the worst possible reason—just because I could,” sounding like a Baptist
preacher who’d been corrupted by power but found salvation.

does not project cunning, and his sins are, so to speak, venial. Charges of
plagiarism derailed his first run at the presidency in 1987. It emerged that as
a law school student at Syracuse, he had lifted five pages from a law review
article; after an inquiry, he had to retake the class. That he also seemed to
have borrowed a few lines from a British Labour politician for his own stump
speech dogged him as well, and he dropped out in September of that year. In
Biden’s own account of the law school inquiry, he was a disorganized
underachiever at the time, and he’d missed the class where they learned the rules
of citation. True or not is beside the point: A Bidenite plagiarist is a man a
little out of his league but good at heart, who knows he doesn’t have a lot of
time because none of us has a lot of
time. It is both an exculpation and an orientation toward fate.       

Biden with his family after announcing his candidacy for the 1988 Democratic presidential nomination.Cynthia Johnson/The LIFE Images Collection/Getty

When Biden was young, he
befriended the old. When he got old, he befriended the young. The personage who
has entered the presidential election is a contradictory figure: a mature young
man who became an immature old man. Nostalgia is the central note of his
presidential campaign, but that nostalgia has many vectors.

First, there is the Biden of the late 20th century. Having emerged as one of the
Senate’s foreign policy wise men, he might have been an interesting Democratic
president for a post–Cold War world, and in fact voted against the first Gulf
War. Biden winning the 1988 election is a potentially interesting
counterfactual scenario. The factual history, though, is dismal: He became one
more member of the cohort that disgraced itself in enabling the Iraq War and
the War on Terror. (His one great distinction, at least, was to be a great
talker with an ear for insult—like his line in 2007 that every Rudy Giuliani
sentence had three parts: “a noun and a verb and 9/11.”) Biden’s pious laments
about “the decline of common decency” in the Senate ring hollow; his cohort
wrought suffering on a scale that overwhelms the grammar of grief that is my
subject here.

there is the reinvented Biden of the vice presidency. In 2008, he added the ballast
of elder statesmanship to the Obama campaign, and appealed to the American
middle. The fact that he had eulogized Strom Thurmond was not a political
liability but an asset. Biden was novel for being the first modern vice
president who was significantly older than the president. (Dick Cheney, though
vampiric, was only five years older than George W. Bush.) The implications of
this age gap for Biden’s own aspirations were not obvious at first, but now,
after eight vice presidential years, he is in the curious position of carrying
on the legacy of a much younger man, a man who was himself received as
generationally transformational. The nostalgia Biden evokes is thus
cross-generational: The eminently memeable bromance of Obama and Uncle Joe has
been a fixture of the smartphones of young voters who have only really known that era.

older liberals, meanwhile, the Obama-Biden friendship has unfortunate overtones
of the movie Green Book, in which a
working-class white-ethnic type forms a familial bond with his more affluent
boss, an extraordinarily talented but rather too aloof black man. A Biden
victory in the Democratic primary would be irritatingly consistent with the
success of Green Book at the Oscars.

then there is the figure of “Diamond Joe,” the caricature of Biden in The Onion that has taken on its own
weird brilliant life. After a first quick appearance at Obama’s inauguration in
January 2009 (“Joe Biden Shows Up To Inauguration With Ponytail”), Diamond
Joe’s real debut was in May of that year: “Shirtless Biden Washes Trans Am In
White House Driveway.” It’s a white Pontiac from 1981, and the stereo blasts
Night Ranger’s “(You Can Still) Rock in America.” Has a satire ever so
effectively overwritten the image of a politician? Where the real Biden’s background
evoked Studs Lonigan, a Depression-era socialist realism without the socialism,
Diamond Joe is a creature wholly of the late 1970s and ’80s. Should Diamond
Joe “pony up 200 smackers” for Scorpions tickets? “This,” he says, “is the
toughest decision I’ve faced.”

full corpus of Diamond Joe amounts to a powerful and paradoxical new origin
story. It is intriguing that this fantasy caricature of Biden makes him an endearing outlaw, when the real Biden’s political legacy includes the 1994 Crime
Bill, and the terrible scale of mass incarceration that followed from it.
Diamond Joe sells drugs and does drugs (“Biden Frantically Hitting Up Cabinet
Members For Clean Piss”), and leaves felonies off of job applications. The
caricature lets its subject lovingly off the hook: Diamond Joe chafes against
the laws that the real Biden pushed through Congress.

he is an ever-more-juvenile septuagenarian. “Biden Donates Collection of
Classic Skin Mags to Those in Need During Holidays”: a single headline threads
Biden’s sexual frankness, his nostalgia, and his sentimental connection to the
down-and-out. Diamond Joe evinces jubilant sleaze without sexual predation. The
people’s taboo-breaker extols masturbation without shame and with generosity.
At other times, Diamond Joe is wistful and wizened. “I have been treated as a
punch line,” he says in a 2012 vice presidential debate. “A dope. A fuckin’
jester among kings. But don’t be fooled. I am also a man who has touched
sorrow.” A keen comic mordancy seeps inexorably into the ballad of Diamond Joe:
“Nude Biden Wakes Up On Cold Slab In D.C. Morgue,” read a headline in 2013.
“Not again,” he says. “Diamond Joe’s not going to the boneyard without a

the real Biden’s career in the Senate began with sudden family tragedy, his
vice presidency closed with a slower one. His oldest son, Beau, followed his
father into politics and became attorney general of Delaware in 2007. In 2013,
he was diagnosed with brain cancer, a Stage IV glioblastoma. After radiation,
chemotherapy, and a more experimental treatment, he died in May 2015. Biden was
again at the center of national sympathy, no longer a young widower but a
grieving father. The outpouring was even more immense now; Beau’s funeral fell
somewhere between a state funeral and a private family funeral to which all
Americans were invited. It felt strangely like mourning a political dynasty
that might have been. Obama delivered a eulogy. The most poignant of Biden’s
generational inversions is to be a father carrying on the legacy of his late

second memoir—Promise Me, Dad: A Year of
Hope, Hardship, and Purpose
—appeared in 2017. It is a complex book, partly
a political memoir and partly a grief memoir. The political memoir bolsters Biden’s
image as ready manager of foreign relations. To Biden falls the major dramas of
Obama’s foreign policy: “Joe will do Iraq,” Obama says. “He knows it. He knows
the players.” The unlikely marriage of genres is often affecting. The official
residence of the vice president, for instance, is the Naval Observatory, which
houses the U.S. Naval Observatory Master Clock, which calibrates the nation’s
Precise Time. “Synchronized to the millisecond,” Biden writes, Precise Time
“had been deemed an operational imperative by the Department of Defense, which
had troops and bases in locations around the globe.” The official time of the
national security state, “ticking away in metronomic perfection,” thus tracks
the melancholy counting down toward a death in the family.

the marriage of genres is also unsettling. Most remarkable is the book’s
explicit and detailed intertwining of Beau’s treatment with the Obama
administration’s first actions against the Islamic State in Iraq. The effect is
curious, for it is not clear whether war is the allegory for Beau’s treatment
or Beau’s treatment is the allegory for war. Beau underwent an experimental
virotherapy in late March 2015, the same week the U.S. launched airstrikes on
the long-suffering city of Tikrit, a site of civil war and sectarian strife in
the wake of U.S. invasion. The virus (a “viral smart bomb,” Biden calls it) is
supposed to mobilize Beau’s immune system against the tumor; the airstrikes are
supposed to unify and boost Iraq’s various factions against ISIS. The procedure
succeeded in Tikrit, but ISIS conquered Ramadi in mid-May; Beau died May 30.
The doctors’ uncertainty—they “couldn’t be sure if it was the virus at work or
the tumor”—resembles the confusion of American foreign policy.

book offers Beau’s death as a sacrifice that might redeem the misbegotten war
in Iraq, for which Biden voted in 2002, and in which Beau served from 2008 to 2009,
as a member of the Delaware National Army Guard: “He always insisted that what
the United States was trying to do was noble,” Biden writes. “If there was a
reasonable chance to get it right in Iraq—for the long term—Beau believed we
should try. We had sacrificed too many good people already to give up.” It is a
powerful gesture, but unsatisfying. The book’s narrative cannot furnish a happy
ending, only a double loss. (The Iraqi recapture of Ramadi, some six months
later, is mentioned in the epilogue; a more robust anti-ISIS strategy emerged
only after the book’s main events.)

October 2015, Biden announced he would not run for president, but in the same
speech channeled his political energies toward a cancer moonshot, framed in
centrist terms: “I know there are Democrats and Republicans on the Hill who
share our passion—our passion to silence this deadly disease.” In 2016, Obama announced
more federal funding for cancer research and collaboration; in his final State
of the Union address, he said he was “putting Joe in charge of Mission
Control,” because Joe had “gone to the mat for all of us.” This, had he rested
there, would have been a fitting and conclusive extension of Biden’s maxim that
all politics is personal: Cancer became the next region he would handle.

Biden with Beau at Camp Victory on the outskirts of Baghdad on July 4, 2009. Khalid Mohammed/AFP/Getty

Step back from Biden’s
forty-some years in national politics. Is there an ideological thread? A
unified theory of Bidenite politics? Not really. One does not look to him for
ideological robustness or even coherence. He is not “divisive,” exactly; it’s
just that his long time in public life leads different people to see different
Joe Bidens: precocious young senator or bumbling old senator, tribune of the “white
working class” or tribune of Delaware-based banks, champion of battered women
or clumsy misogynist, friend of cops or outlaw Diamond Joe. He has registered
rather than transcended the major tensions of his time.

on another level it is possible to
articulate what for Biden is the elemental atom of political interaction: It is
the communion of strangers on a train, who happen to pour their griefs out to
one another because, after all, it’s easier with someone you don’t really know.
Such an atom yields no grand vision of politics, and hardly meets our moment.
But it still vibrates on a poignantly American frequency. Biden is the
politician of fleeting but profound intimacy.

one remarkable detail from his memoir. He gave a eulogy at the funeral of one
of the two police officers killed in New York City in 2014; the remarkable
thing is not the eulogy itself but what he tells one of the widows privately.
Right now everyone is there for you, he says, but eventually they’ll go back to
normal, and then grief will get harder: “After a while you’re going to start to
feel guilty because you’re going to be going to the same people constantly for
help, or just to talk.” So he gives her his private number: “When you’re down
and you feel guilty for burdening your family and friends, pick up the phone
and call me.” The reader glimpses a secret society of grievers:

I have
a long list of strangers who have my private number, and an invitation to call,
and many of them do. “Just call me when you want to talk,” I told her.
“Sometimes it’s easier to pour your heart out to somebody you don’t know well,
but you know they know. You know they’ve been through it. Just pick up the
phone and call me.”

It is hard to imagine reaching
for the phone to call, in a dark and lonely hour, the sitting vice president of
the United States. And yet I hope this strange, beautiful story is true.

is not a culture comfortable with death. According to Philippe Ariès’s The Hour of Our Death, a monumental
thousand-year history of Western attitudes toward dying, life’s inevitable
conclusion was, in the deeper past, “tame,” its meaning known, its ceremonies
familiar. Over the centuries death was untamed, individualized, romanticized,
desperately and neurotically denied. Modernity made death a taboo: An ambient
anxiety about death looms, yet we banish it from consciousness. Medicalization,
furthermore, moved death from the home to the hospital. These glacial shifts
remade mourning, too. In the deeper past, mourning had a genuinely communal,
public function. “Mourning,” Ariès writes, “expressed the anguish of a
community that had been visited by death, contaminated by its presence,
weakened by the loss of one of its members.” In the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, mourning was privatized: confined to the family, to the home and the
“funeral home” (a modern industry).

medicalization of grief, as a psychological condition, tracked the
medicalization of death. In the 1960s, the British anthropologist Geoffrey
Gorer took stock of modern mourning, after finding that his own persistent
grief over his dead brother had produced a strange social awkwardness. He
concluded that grieving was now treated “with much the same prudery as the
sexual impulses were a century ago. … Today it would seem to be believed, quite
sincerely, that sensible, rational men and women can keep their mourning under
complete control by strength of will and character, so that it need be given no
public expression, and indulged, if at all, in private, as furtively as if it
were an analogue to masturbation.” Ariès put it this way: “The bereaved is
crushed between the weight of his grief and the weight of the social

now-conventional therapeutic vocabularies of grief began as rebellions against
that mid-century prohibition. Elisabeth Kübler-Ross’s On Death and Dying appeared in 1969. What she identified as the
stages of a terminally ill person’s confrontation with death—denial, anger,
bargaining, depression, and acceptance—were soon doubled into the bereaved
person’s “stages of grief.” What was a rebellion—to describe directly the thing
from which we had learned to look away—became, over time, less descriptive than
prescriptive. The stages of grief seeped so fully into the culture that it
became a kind of recipe. And grief remained a malady to be gotten over.

often speaks the conventional surface language. In October 2015, he cited the
“grieving process” in his decision not to run for president. “I know from previous
experience that there’s no timetable for this process,” he said. “The process
doesn’t respect or much care about things like filing deadlines or debates and
primaries and caucuses.” Process:
standardized yet not communal, internal yet foreign to our selfhoods, as if
grief were a paramecium. The same day, The
Washington Post
ran a news item: “Joe Biden made the right decision not to
run for president, grief experts say.”

the ’70s, Biden worked through grief—needed
to work through grief. This was soon after the publication of Kübler-Ross’s On Death and Dying, but before the
“stages of grief” had really congealed. He now spans the pre-Kübler-Ross and
post-Kübler-Ross discourses. When grief was, as Gorer found, a thing to be
mastered in public, some would succeed in mastering it and others wouldn’t.
Biden, paradoxically, talks and writes publicly about not wanting to give vent
to private grief, based on the old idea that such expression would be unseemly,
but at the same time he does express
it, and does so eloquently, moving in and out of the therapeutic vocabulary. He
is grief’s charismatic confessor, tuned to that select constituency of

are many reasons not to want Biden to run for president; grief, understood as
some psychological enfeeblement, should not have been one of them. Our overblown
cult of the presidency makes us imagine that the president has to be a
political athlete in top mental and emotional condition, a “Commander in Chief”
who fields 3 a.m. phone calls and keeps us
. This already idiotic byproduct of the imperial presidency and the
national security state became steroidically idiotic after September 11, 2001.
Obama, alas, fed it rather than deflated it. Biden did, too, and thus
ironically laid a trap for his own presidential ambitions. The most absurd
moment in Promise Me, Dad is a
private conversation with Obama: “The country can never be more hopeful than
its president,” Biden tells Obama. “Don’t make me ‘Hope.’ You gotta go out there and be ‘Hope.’” The premise is
nonsensical: Why would the country never be more hopeful than its president?
But more to the point, be hope is so
manifestly opposed to Biden’s own real resonance in American culture. He has
embodied not hope, but grief.

to put it more precisely, it has been Biden’s fate to embody the contradictions
of modern grief. Promise Me, Dad bears
some harmonies with a novel published in the same year, another intimate study
of fatherly grief: George Saunders’s Lincoln
in the Bardo
, which centers on President Lincoln grieving his dead son in
1862. That novel conjures a strange supernatural language in order to capture
Lincoln’s taboo-breaking act of going to the cemetery to cradle his son’s
corpse. Biden, beneath the surface language of the “grieving process,” also
breaks the taboo. His 3 a.m. phone calls come from grieving strangers. It is oddly
poetic, in light of the scandal over Biden’s handsiness, that these encounters
smack of “Strangers in the Night,” but with condolence in place of carnality. I
am not suggesting that he offers a solution to our squeamishness, for it has no
solution, only that his funereal entrance into and exit from national politics
made him the rare politician to cross the line between public and private mourning.

signal irony of Biden’s career is that while he has long sought the presidency,
grief has best fitted him to the vice presidency, a job traditionally scorned
by other ambitious men. Gerald Ford’s vice president, Nelson Rockefeller, was
asked what he did in the job: “I go to funerals,” he complained, “I go to
earthquakes.” But Biden, American threnodist, filled that empty position with
more meaning than the Constitution’s authors could ever have imagined: It
proved to be the ideal avenue for his full emergence as our itinerant mourner. He
made mourning not a malady but an art.

Biden and his family at Beau’s funeral in Wilmington, Delaware, on June 6, 2015.Mark Makela/Getty

“I grieve that grief can teach
me nothing.” The sentence is Emerson’s, from “Experience,” an essay written in
1844, two years after his own son’s death. How cold it seems, at least at
first, as if the primary grief is canceled mathematically out by the secondary
grief: Grief has no utility, let us dispense with it. A terrible
thought. But this is a misreading, for that secondary grief about grief’s
failure is, after all, still its own kind of grief. This is also terrible, but
not cold. One feels in it a quiet, spiraling sorrow.

Emersonian recitations in his childhood mirror notwithstanding, is the
un-Emerson: Grief has been central to his education. It has taught him a manner
of communion, something like a pre-political or supra-political language. It is
esoteric but crosses political divides. What that grief should teach us,
as a polity, is harder to say. Biden’s 2020 campaign marshals grief anew, in a
manner distinct from the secret, salutary mourning he performed as vice
president. Sad ironies abound in this. Grief—unmastered, unprocessed—kept him
from running in 2016, though he may very well have won. But now, grief has been
refined into purpose (we might call it Biden’s sixth stage of grief) and
propels him toward the presidency again.

should not underestimate the force of this appeal, drawing as it does on
another kind of grief. Biden 2020 lowers a bucket into the broad and deep well
of liberal grief dug by the 2016 election and by the disasters it has wrought.
Polls are ill-equipped to isolate such collective grief and its electoral
implications, especially when coiled with nostalgia. It is fitting that Biden
placed the 2017 Charlottesville attacks at the center of his announcement, and
more fitting that he made a personal call to the mother of the woman who was
killed that day: He would forge a spiritual link between the bereaved, and
between Heather Heyer and his own son, and thus bring one grief-borne purpose together with another.

is not the same thing as wisdom, though grief can yield both. Biden’s appeal is
therapeutic rather than structural; it is less a “message” than a psychological
drama. That he has superimposed private grief onto our political moment is
powerful. But it is still a superimposition and possibly a category error,
though made in good faith. Biden is surely not alone in that error. Trump’s
election inspired endless applications of Kübler-Ross’s stages to national
politics, in earnest or in jest. Those stages are, I fear, an even less
adequate recipe for political action than they are for grief itself. It would
be a cruel irony that the politician most identified with the “grieving
process” would now launch a presidential campaign that is stuck somewhere in the
stages of denial, anger, or bargaining.

I want to close this melancholy
essay not with callous prognostication but with my own small salute to
itinerant mourners. It involves funerals and a ribald pun. I was 22 when my
father died, years ago. My own grief did not fit the stages, and it defied
“process.” Surely I did it wrong. Anyhow, an old friend of my father’s showed
up to the funeral, a man I had never met and whose name I do not remember. This
old friend was not a local guy—my father grew up in Brooklyn but the family had
moved to Wisconsin, and I’m pretty sure they had long fallen out of touch. I
have no idea how he knew my father had died. What I do remember is him telling
me a story about them in Brooklyn, probably in the mid-1960s, when they were
themselves 20 or so. One day they arrived at my father’s family’s apartment
just as his mother, my grandmother, was leaving the house. She was on her way
to a funeral. It was a social obligation rather than the funeral of someone
close, but for some reason she was totally decked out, as the stranger told
it—all black and even wearing a veil. “Georgie,”
she asks my father, “do I look
sufficiently funereal?
” My dad’s response: “Mom, you look like you’ve got a
funereal disease.” It was the right story and I was grateful.

Leave a Reply